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ANATOMY OF A DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES CASE
by
Michael P. Lynn*S INCE the enactment of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices--Consum-
er Protection Act,' consumer protection has come to mean more than the
simple warranty claim on the family car or registering complaints with the
Better Business Bureau. Today any consumer, corporate or individual, 2 who
since the enactment of the DTPA has been adversely affected 3 by a misre-
presentation4 in the sale of a good or service,5 may bring suit pursuant to the
Act. If successful, the plaintiff may recover treble his economic and other
personal damages 6 from the defendant.7 The plaintiff may recover even if
the consumer is not in privity8 with the defendant and even if the defendant
does not have knowledge that his representation was other than completely
true.
* B.A., University of Virginia; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at law,
Dallas, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77) [hereinafter cited
and referred to as DTPA or Act].
2. As initially enacted in 1973, the DTPA permitted only individuals to bring suit. Since
the term "individual," unlike the term "person," did not include partnerships or corporations,
those types of business entities could not bring suit pursuant to the Act. Tex. Laws 1973, ch.
143, § 1, at 323. The 1975 amendments to the Act broadened the protected class and thereafter
corporations and partnerships were included in the definition of consumer. Tex. Laws 1975, ch.
62, § 1, at 149. The 1977 amendments to the DTPA further expanded the scope of the Act to
include governmental entities. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 1, at 600.
3. A consumer need only be "adversely affected" to bring an action pursuant to the terms
of the DTPA § 17.50.
4. Eighteen of the specifically proscribed deceptive acts are actually different forms of
misrepresentation. DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(l)-(17), (19). The two remaining proscriptions deal with
pyramid schemes. DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(18), (20). Also declared unlawful are violations of art.
21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code, Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 4, at 603, and all unconscionable
acts as defined in the 1977 amendments to be: "(A) [taking] advantage of the lack of knowledge,
ability, experience, or capacity of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or (B) [resulting] in a
gross disparity between the value received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving
transfer of consideration." Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 1, at 600.
5. For transactions entered into between May 21, 1973, and May 23, 1977, the term
"services" is defined as "work, labor, or service purchased or leased for use, for other than
commercial or business use." Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 62, § 1, at 149. The 1977 amendments which
became effective May 23, 1977, have deleted the business use exception, thereby creating a
cause of action for misrepresentation in accounting, business, banking, and insurance. Tex.
Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 1, at 600. For an explanation of the difficulty encountered interpreting the
business use exception see Lynn, A Remedy for Undermade and Oversold Products-The
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 698, 706 (1976).
6. Any provable claim for injury or loss is actionable even if the loss results from the
purchase of a house or the purchase of a security. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662
(Tex. 1977); Rio Grande Oil Co. v. State, 539 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
7. The Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 817, §
12.01(a), at 2053, provides that the DTPA shall not apply to physicians or health care providers
for injuries which have resulted from negligence on the part of the health care provider.
Arguably, since the DTPA proscribes only misrepresentation and not negligent conduct, the
new safe harbor provision of § 12.01 misses the mark. See 4 Caveat Vendor, Aug. 1977, at 2
(Texas State Bar).
8. Until May 23, 1977, the "failure by any person to comply" with an express or implied
warranty was actionable. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 143, § 1, at 326. The failure-to-comply phrase has
been amended to read "breach of an express or implied warranty" to bring it into conformity
with the language used in the UCC. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 5, at 603. See TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.714 (Tex. UCC 1968). The majority rule in Texas has been that a
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On its face the DTPA requires a plaintiff to prove that a sale occurred,
that the defendant participated in making a misrepresentation, and that the
plaintiff was adversely affected by the misrepresentation.9 No express lan-
guage in the DTPA requires the courts to determine whether a falsehood is
material, whether the plaintiff should have relied upon a misrepresentation,
whether the plaintiff in fact relied upon a misrepresentation, or even
whether the misrepresentation caused the injury to the plaintiff. Neverthe-
less, the Texas attorney general has recently suggested that a private plain-
tiff under the DTPA must prove that the representation is material to the
extent that it has the "capacity to deceive" in order to recover for the
alleged violation. 0 That position, however, is contrary to the position taken
by a former chief of the consumer protection division of the attorney
general's office, who argues that in most cases no materiality standard
applies and that proof that a defendant committed one of the twenty pros-
cribed acts is per se violative of the DTPA. I I In addition to the disagreement
between members of the staff who drafted the statute, 12 case and statutory
developments have further unraveled whatever concensus may have been
reached on the meaning of the DTPA, leaving both practitioners and judges
understandably confused as to how to submit a DTPA case to the jury. 3
The purpose of this Article is to supplement and extend the analysis of an
earlier article which suggested that the concepts of materiality, reliance, and
causation are part of the prima facie case which must be proved in actions
brought pursuant to the DTPA.' 4 The conclusion of this Article is that not all
consumer must have privity to bring a suit for an express or implied warranty. Compare
Foremost Mobile Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no
writ), with Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 539 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1976), aff'd 21 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 5 (Oct. 8, 1977). Therefore, suits which allege breach
of warranty as the only deceptive act must often overcome the consumer's lack of privity to
maintain the suit. In language parallel to that contained in the UCC, the DTPA also declares
various overlapping misrepresentations contained in §§ 17.46(b)(l)-(20) to be unlawful. Because
those proscriptions sound in fraud rather than in warranty or contract, no privity is required to
bring suit pursuant to those proscriptions. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 685 (4th ed. 1971).
Thus, the plaintiff can avoid the privity issue by pleading the implicit representation rather than
the implied warranties of a product as a violation of the DTPA. Cf. Bourland v. State, 528
S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attorney found liable for mere
participation in scheme rather than for attorneys' privity with plaintiffs). See also Lynn, supra
note 5, at 718. But see Cloer v. General Motors Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1070, 1072 (E.D. Tex.
1975).
9. DTPA § 17.50.
10. Hill, Introduction to Consumer Law Symposium, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 609, 613 (1977).
11. Maxwell, Public and Private Rights and Remedies Under the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 625 (1977). "Those 20 practices are
made per se violations; there is no requirement for an issue or a finding that the practice has the
tendency or capacity to deceive." Id. According to Maxwell, when the allegedly deceptive act
is not one of the 20 practices made per se violations, the capacity to deceive tests should still
apply. Id. at 623.
12. The initial draft of the DTPA was written by the Austin Ass'n of Young Lawyers,
Consumer Section. Telephone interview with Joe Longley, Sept. 1977.
13. In Littleton v. Woods, 538 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976), rev'd in
part, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977), the court of appeals recognized the state of the confusion
when it wrote:
The ambivalent approach in the trial court to both common law and statutory
actions and relief indicate a mixed conception of the theory upon which liability
and relief should be rested under the pleadings and proof . . . [I]t appears the
case was tried upon a wrong theory and that under the facts that might be
proved if pled and tried on a profit theory, Woods might justly prevail.
538 S.W.2d at 803.
14. Lynn, supra note 5, at 708.
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misrepresentations, even those which adversely affect a specific consumer,
should rise to the level of an actionable deceptive act or misrepresentation.
There are falsehoods which are not material because they simply should not
mislead the reasonable consumer and do not in fact mislead the particular
plaintiff since he does not rely upon them. Both materiality and reliance are
related to causation and provide the court with a basis for distinguishing
those misrepresentations which "adversely affect or damage" the rea-
sonable consumer from those which do not or should not damage that
consumer.
I. MATERIALITY
The Texas attorney general urges that a misrepresentation is material if it
has the capacity to deceive any consumer. 5 He reasons that the Texas
courts are "expressly instructed" to follow federal court interpretation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act;16 since the capacity to deceive, rather
than actual deception, is all that is required to be proven under the FTC
Act,' 7 it is likewise all that is required in actions brought pursuant to the
DTPA. The language to which the attorney general refers"8 now provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this
section in suits brought under Section 17.50 of this subchapter the
courts to the extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this
section and the interpretations given by the federal courts to Section
5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A. 45(g)(1)]. 19
A review of the problems encountered by the FTC in applying the capac-
ity to deceive standard, consideration of the functions that such a standard
serves in the Government's enforcement scheme, and the likely shortcom-
ings of that standard in the context of private damage actions demonstrates
that incorporating the FTC capacity to deceive standard into the private
DTPA cause of action is simply unwarranted and unfair. Because such a
standard serves neither the consumer's nor the merchant's interest, its use
in the context of a private damages action is not possible within the meaning
of section 17.46(c) of the DTPA.
15. Hill, supra note 10, at 613.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FTC Act] provides that unfair methods of
competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are unlawful.
17. See, e.g., Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1957); Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944).
18. Hill, supra note 10, at 613.
19. Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 1, at 600 (emphasis added). Prior to 1977, DTPA § 17.46(c)
read:
It is the intent of the legislature that in construing Subsection (a) of this section
the courts to the extent possible will be guided by Subsection (b) of this section
and the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and federal
courts to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C.A.
45(a)(1)].
Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 143, § I, at 324 (emphasis added). As amended, § 17.46(c) provides in
essence that in suits brought by the Government pursuant to § 17.47 the courts are to the extent
possible to be guided by interpretations of the FTC and federal courts. In private damage
actions the courts are to be guided to the extent possible by the interpretations given by the
federal courts. See Comment, Caveat Vendor: The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 438-42 (1973), as to why the changes were
made. At least one Texas court has decided that the FTC lead need not always be followed. See
Vargas v. Allied Fin. Co., 545 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1977]
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Section 5(a)(l) of the FTC Act outlaws all misrepresentations and decep-
tive trade practices. The FTC, which is given sole responsibility to enforce
that section,20 may not seek a cease and desist order unless it is in the public
interest for it to do so, and the purported misrepresentation has the capacity
to deceive. To enforce a cease and desist order, the FTC may petition a
federal court for an injunction ordering the defendant to cease and desist
from whatever conduct has been condemned by the FTC.
Some courts and commentators, interpreting the FTC mandate, have
linked the public interest test with a materiality standard, reasoning that an
insignificant or trivial misrepresentation cannot be attacked by the FTC
because such an action would not be in the public interest.2 Despite such
reasoning, the capacity to deceive standard has been applied so as to leave
the FTC free to prosecute the slightest and most trivial misrepresentation. 22
In so doing, the FTC may have attained some purity in advertising language,
but has failed to advance significantly the protection of the consumer. 23 An
example often cited as the high-water mark of such trivial prosecutions is
Gelb v. FTC,24 in which the Commission's cease and desist order was upheld
against a merchant who represented that a hair coloring product could
"color hair permanently." The Commission claimed that the respondent's
use of the term "permanently" was misleading since hair not yet grown
when the product was applied would retain its natural color. Only one
consumer testified, after much prodding, that although she was not deceived
she was sure that someone might have misunderstood the ad. As the FTC
hearing demonstrated, it is unlikely that anyone but the most naive and
credulous consumer would have understood permanent to mean "forever,"
especially when the temporary styling of a woman's hair is also incorrectly
but popularly termed "a permanent."
Nevertheless, while the FTC has on occasion prosecuted trivial claims
and misrepresentations, there are sound policy justifications supporting the
capacity to deceive standard when used to obtain a cease and desist order
for the Government. In such actions the Government is seeking to prevent a
20. See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926). The consumer,
however, may soon have a private remedy under the proposed amendments to the FTC Act. See
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act: Hearings on H.R. 3816 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
21. See, e.g., FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933); Developments in the Law-
Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1056 (1967).
22. But see Heinz Kircher, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), aff'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964)
("An advertiser cannot be charged with . . . every conceivable misconception, however
outlandish, to which his representations might be subject among the foolish or feeble-mind-
ed."); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (Commission has the right to issue cease and
desist orders if representations are likely to mislead appreciable segment of public).
23. See General Elec. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944); Charles of the Ritz Distrib.
Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (establishing lower standard of materiality which has
been raised by subsequent cases). Posner has observed that the FTC has concentrated upon the
trivial and inconsequential deception in the marketplace, thereby insuring truth at the consum-
er's expense. R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 5, 17 (1973). See also
Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 661, 671 (1977).
24. 144 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1944). In contrast to a private action for damages, government
suits to enfoce securities law require less proof of the deceptive nature of the misrepresenta-
tion. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63, 84 (2d Cir. 1970).
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"deceptive act" from being committed in the future, and is not bringing suit
to compensate the consumer for past harm. Thus, a reduced burden of proof
is appropriate since it is usually impossible for the Government to demon-
strate with any degree of certainty that actual deception will occur in the
future.
Furthermore, the Government has a policy role to play in focusing con-
sumer attention on new information which should affect the public's deci-
sion to purchase, but which at the time the policy decision is initiated, does
not. For example, the Government could bring suits which call the consum-
er's attention to false statements with regard to a product's consumption of
energy, 25 a product's effect on the environment or health, 26 or even the fact
that a company is using unethical practices in producing a product. 27 None
of those areas of information may represent current concerns of the con-
sumer; yet each could affect a consumer's decision to purchase if the
consumer were properly informed. The omission of such information can
therefore logically be considered deceptive. Finally, because the Govern-
ment's equitable action operates prospectively, a court's judgment can be
molded to the various conditions which are expected to develop in the
prosecuted firm or industry and to changes in the needs of the consuming
public.2
On balance, the capacity to deceive standard in a Government equitable
action can benefit the consumer by increasing the ability of the Government
to deal effectively with new forms of deception. With that increased flexibil-
ity, however, there has been an increase in the FTC's ability and, in fact, the
FTC's propensity, to prosecute the insignificant and the trivial. 29 Neverthe-
less, as with any government action, an ill-conceived or poorly-executed
policy can ultimately be checked by political intervention.30 No such check,
however, exists to prevent the private damage action using a capacity to
deceive standard from going awry, resulting in clogged dockets and policies
dictated by minor cases of little or no concern to the public at large. The
capacity to deceive test, which was borrowed by the Texas attorney general
from FTC actions, was never designed to be used in the private action for
damages.3 The FTC Act, in fact, grants no private cause of action. Moreov-
25. Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 409.1 (1977) (durability of the household lightbulb); id. §§ 259.1, .2
(mileage which automobile gets per gallon of gasoline must be clearly specified).
26. See, e.g., proposed rule on cigarettes in relation to health hazards of smoking. 30 Fed.
Reg. 9485 (1965); 29 Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964) (to have been codified in 16 C.F.R. § 408).
27. Whether the forced disclosure of the ethical stance of the seller violates the first
amendment is questionable. See note 78 infra and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the
beginnings of an ethical investor test in securities law may be discerned. See, e.g., Bryan v.
Aston, [1976] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,730 (W.D. Ky. 1976). But see address by A.A.
Sommer, Jr., "The Slippery Slope of Materiality," reprinted in MATERIALITY: AN EVOLVING
CONCEPT UNDER THE SECURITIES LAW (PLI 1975).
28. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) which provides for modification of an extant order
when the underlying circumstances supporting the order change.
29. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 128 (1949); E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE
CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 165 (1969); R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 5,
17.
30. See Pitofsky, supra note 23, at 687-92; Thain, Advertising Regulation: The Contempor-
ary FTC Approach, I FORDHAM URB. L.J. 349 (1973).
31. "If the conduct could mislead the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, it violates
the law." Hill, supra note 10, at 613.
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er, decisions cited by the attorney general, 2 ostensibly demonstrating ac-
ceptance of that standard by Texas courts, are either injunctive actions
prosecuted by the Government alone, or cases in which a private action was
brought and the materiality issue was discussed only peripherally.
3
Examination of the functions a materiality standard performs in a private
action for damages not only helps to define the contours of a workable
standard of materiality, but also demonstrates that a stricter standard than
the mere capacity to deceive any consumer standard is necessary. The
phrase "capacity to deceive" implies that the asserted falsehood "might"
deceive the class of consumers to whom it is directed. To prove the tort of
common law fraud, however, the courts have required proof that a misre-
presentation "would deceive" the reasonable consumer.3 4 Between the
"might deceive" standard inherent in the capacity to deceive test and the
"would deceive" standard applied in the fraud cases lies the "significant
propensity to deceive" test which has been applied in recent securities
litigation.35
The capacity to deceive standard implies that a misrepresentation need
not be the sole cause of a consumer's purchase and may mislead only a few
consumers. The would deceive standard, on the other hand, implies that the
misrepresentation must be the factor in the reasonable consumer's decision
to purchase. In the mass marketing situation, the consumer would have to
prove that a specific representation, out of all that daily deluge the public,
would cause the reasonable consumer to purchase.3 6 The significant propen-
sity test requires that the misrepresentation be a major but not the only
factor in the consumer's decision to purchase.
Just as the DTPA clearly was not intended to act as a device to insure the
consumer against a bad bargain, neither was it intended to require absolute
proof that a misrepresentation would cause an injury in all instances. The
32. Id. at 613 & n.28.
33. Goodman v. FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 602 (9th Cir. 1957); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp.
v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944); Bourland v. State, 528 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wesware, Inc. v. State, 488 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1972, no writ). Only one case, Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1977, writ filed) has expressly followed the capacity to deceive standard in
the private damage action and has confronted the difficulties posed by that standard.
34. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1938) which states that a fact is material if its
existence is a matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining his
choice of action.
35. See, e.g., Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970). In that case, the
Supreme Court defined materiality as a significant propensity to affect the voting process in a
proxy contest.
36. The FTC or the fact-finder in a DTPA case may rely upon its own common sense (the
hunch), expert testimony, surveys, or dictionary definitions to determine whether the rea-
sonable consumer would misunderstand or be misled by the asserted misrepresentation. A
survey which attempts to demonstrate the number of typical consumers who would be misled
by the alleged misrepresentation is the most objective evidence. For example, in Rhodes
Pharmacal Co., 49 F.T.C. 263 (1952), aff'd, 208 F.2d 382, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'don other
grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955), the Commission found that a survey which demonstrated only 9%
of those surveyed were misled by the advertisements was sufficient to demonstrate the
deceptive capacity of the advertisement. A 14% figure has also supported the materiality
finding. Benrus Watch Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 16,541.
Presumably, a "would deceive" standard would substantially raise these percentages. For
suggested guidelines on interpreting consumer surveys, which with slight alteration could be
used as a jury instruction, see Gellhorn, Proof of a Consumer Deception Before the Federal
Trade Commission, 17 U. KAN. L. REV. 559, 572 (1969).
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twenty acts specifically proscribed by the DTPA concern major factors in
the decision of the reasonable consumer to purchase a good or service.3 7
Thus, a falsehood, to be actionable under the Act, should have more than
the mere possibility of affecting the reasonable consumer's decision to act;
the misrepresentation should also be a significant factor in the consumer's
decision to act. Materiality in such cases serves two important functions:
first, it insures that the consumer bear his share of the responsibility in
arriving at the decision to purchase or otherwise act on a misrepresentation;
secondly, it is the only element linking the particular omission or misrepre-
sentation with the asserted injury.
Proving that the misrepresentation possessed the capacity to deceive any
consumer, however, does not raise the level of materiality above that
required to screen the trivial or irrelevant misrepresentation. 8 The most
transparent puff, which was not intended to be taken literally, could be
actionable.39 The barker at the fair who tells the crowd that the creature in a
side show comes from the deepest recesses of Africa could hardly be
making a representation to be taken literally. Nor could the oil company
which advises you that it puts a "tiger in your tank" be taken at its word. To
be sure, there are those who will be deceived by such statements, but there
must exist a minimal level of sophistication which is to be expected of the
reasonable consumer. That minimal level of competence may be less than
the average capability of the typical consumer, and perhaps when advertis-
ing is directed at a particular subclass of consumers, such as children, the
objective test must reflect a still lower standard. 40
As a general standard of materiality, the capacity to deceive any consum-
er is simply not appropriate in the case of the private damage suit. Indeed,
such a low standard could actually force the advertiser to reduce the quanti-
ty and quality of the information disseminated, thereby perpetuating con-
sumer ignorance. Such a perverse effect might well result if the advertiser,
in an attempt to provide every consumer with all relevant information, feels
constrained to choose between submitting a multi-page disclaimer similar to
a securities' prospectus, larded with technical and legal descriptions, or
risking the effects of a crippling damage suit. Moreover, even if the mer-
chant attempts to tell all, there would be no guarantee that all the relevant
information could be portrayed in a sufficiently attractive package to hold
the typical consumer's attention. Those problems would be magnified for
37. See, e.g., DTPA §§ 17.46(b)(2), (5), (12). See also Byrd v. Ford, 539 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
38. Pitofsky accurately pinpoints the proper goal to be achieved in applying the materiality
standard: "[Pirotection of consumer against advertising fraud should not be a broad theoretical
effort to achieve truth, but rather a practical enterprise to insure the existence of reliable data
which in turn would facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive market process." Pitofsky,
supra note 23, at 671. See also Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213
(1961).
39. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 9-16 (1976); Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64 (1970);
Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67(1973).
40. See, e.g., ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 1976-I Trade Cas. 60,758 (2d Cir.
1976); Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F.2d 358 (Ist Cir. 1962).
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the merchant selling a new or technically innovative product and the small
merchant who would not have the financial or technical means to determine
what may be material information. 41
The most appropriate standard of materiality would require that the false-
hood should have a significant propensity to deceive the reasonable consum-
er in the class of person to whom the advertisement is directed. Under such
a standard, the plaintiff-consumer would not be allowed to speculate about
whether a representation "may" deceive; rather, he would be required to
prove that the representation probably would be a significant factor in the
decision of the reasonable consumer within the audience to whom the
advertisement was directed. The "significant factor" test would encourage
the consumer to search out the truth of matters asserted in the market place.
At the same time, preserving a moderate burden of proof would be conson-
ant with the deterrent purpose of the Act.4 2
In practice the issues submitted to the fact finder would first inquire
whether certain alleged misrepresentations were made. If so, the fact finder
would be asked if those misrepresentations were material to the reasonable
consumer within the class of persons to whom they were directed. A
material misrepresentation would in turn be defined as one which would be a
significant factor in affecting the consumer's decision to take the action
resulting in his injury. Of course, when the product is complex and the
consumer has no real alternative to accepting the merchant's representation
as true, the responsibility of the consumer to ascertain the truth of the
matter asserted would be only that of the reasonable consumer; the effective
consumer advocate could stress the inability of the typical or reasonable
consumer to do anything but accept the product as it was presented to him.
II. RELIANCE AND CAUSATION
Once the materiality of a misrepresentation is proven, the plaintiff-con-
sumer must demonstrate that the misrepresentation caused him harm. In an
action for common law fraud the courts have traditionally required the
plaintiff-consumer to demonstrate that he relied upon the misrepresenta-
tion.4" The question submitted to the fact finder in such cases is: In view of
the experience and education of the plaintiff, can it be said that the misre-
presentation caused the alleged injury?" Deterrence at all costs should not
be sought; rather, deterrence should be the goal so long as it coincides with
the policy of compensating the injured consumer.45
Despite express language in the DTPA which requires that a misrepresen-
tation adversely affect the consumer,46 and despite the opinion of a former
41. R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 4-9.
42. Since this significant propensity test is midway between the "would deceive" standard
and the "might deceive" standard, one would expect the percentage of reasonable consumers
deceived to fall between the standards. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, at 714.
44. See, e.g., Bynum v. Signal Life Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. If the DTPA is purely punitive, the statute should be characterized as criminal and the
traditional constitutional safeguards such as state prosecution, indictment, and a burden of
proof standard of beyond a reasonable doubt should be required.
46. DTPA § 17.50.
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chief of the consumer protection division that causation is a necessary
element,4 7 the Texas attorney general has recently submitted that the con-
sumer's reliance is not an issue in a case brought pursuant to the DTPA.
48
Since causation and reliance relate the injury suffered by the plaintiff to the
act of the defendant, 49 the attorney general is again at odds with the opinion
of his staff and has created confusion regarding subtle problems of proof,
damages, and causation."
The courts should fashion a causation element to limit the liability of the
representer and to limit damages once liability is found. In the face-to-face
transaction the courts should closely examine the precise representation
made by the defendant, and determine if, in view of the plaintiff's knowl-
edge or experience, the representation caused the alleged injuryi 1 When,
however, the goods or services are mass marketed, detailed examination of
the precise representation relied upon will be all but impossible; the plain-
tiff-consumer may not be able to identify the precise misrepresentation and
may also have difficulty proving that the alleged misrepresentation caused
the product's loss of market value when there are many factors which may
contribute to that decline.
For example, if a product is purchased because of a misrepresentation,
the plaintiff will not be given more than a reasonable time after he discovers
the misrepresentation to take corrective action on his own behalf to avoid
further damages. Thus, while the misrepresentation may have caused the
"purchase," the "injury" caused by the purchase is limited by the consum-
er's subsequent behavior.5 2 If a consumer purchases a new but defective car
which carries a warranty against defects in workmanship and parts, and he
later discovers a defect and has a reasonable time to take corrective meas-
ures to protect himself and the car, the consumer should be responsible for
those damages which were caused by his ignoring the defect. If the consum-
er discovers the defect before an accident, the consumer would probably
recover the value of the car as represented less the value of the car actually
purchased. If the car is involved in an accident which injures the plaintiff,
the plaintiff's own reckless disregard for a discovered defect may have
47. Address by Joe Longley to the Consumer Section, Texas Bar Association (July 3,
1976). See also Maxwell, Damages Under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act, in DAMAGES C-I (Professional Development Program, State Bar of Texas, Sept. 29, 1977).
48. See Hill, supra note 10, at 613.
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 548, 548A (1965).
50. See Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143,149 (Tex. Civ. App.- Beaumont 1977, writ
filed), in which Judge Keith, dissenting, properly criticized the majority opinion for upholding a
submission of the materiality standard in terms of "capacity or tendency to deceive an average
or ordinary person, even though that person may have been ignorant, unthinking or credulous."
Id. at 149 n.8. Judge Keith, however, was right for the wrong reasons; instead of focusing on
the unduly low materiality standard, he argued that the particular plaintiff in this case was too
sophisticated to rely on the misrepresentation. Until the various elements of the DTPA cause of
action are analyzed in terms of the policy behind the Act the courts will remain adrift.
51. See, e.g., Ramos v. Levingston, 536 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,
no writ); Bynum v. Signal Life Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. See, e.g., Redder, Measuring Buyers' Damage in lOb-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839
(1976); Note, Mitigation of Damages Through the Use of Stock Market Indicators, 47 IND. L.J.
367 (1972).
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caused the injury.5 3 In the above example, the consumer's "unreasonable-
ness" would be introduced to mitigate or lessen damages,5 4 not to shield
totally the defendant from liability.
5
When the consumer does not cause the injury, the court should be more
liberal in allowing proof of causation and in some cases should shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to prove what segment of the asserted
harm was not caused by the defendant's conduct. If, for example, a plaintiff
purchases a security for one hundred dollars but finds that the seller over-
represented the security's value by twenty-five percent, the true injury
suffered by the investor at the time of the purchase would be twenty-five
dollars.56 Assume that before the investor can take any action to recover the
twenty-five dollars, the company in which he invested leaves the market,
reducing the value of the security to zero. Did the seller's misrepresentation,
which admittedly caused the purchase and perhaps the injury of twenty-five
dollars to the investor, cause the remaining seventy-five dollar loss? The
court should probably allow the full one hundred dollar recovery since the
cause of the security's decline in value would normally be impossible to
isolate, and the investor would find it impossible to prove that the particular
misrepresentation which induced the purchase also caused the total injury.5 7
The defendant, however, should have the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie case that the misrepresentation which induced the purchase also
caused the injury by proving that it was an intervening cause and not the
defendant's conduct that injured the plaintiff-consumer.5 8 Such a solution
would offer the defendant protection from exaggerated consumer claims
53. Ladd v. Knowles, 505 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) codifies the general rules for such
apportionments:
Apportionment of harm to causes
(I) damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where:
(a) There are distinct harms, or
(b) There is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each
cause to a single harm.
(2) damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more
causes.
54. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 586
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (some portion of diminution of Leasco's price due to market factors which
would have affected any security and thus, to that extent, plaintiff's damages not caused by the
omissions in registration statement). See also Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
55. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1017 (5th Cir. 1977); Comment, The Due
Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs Under Rule lob-5, 1975 DUKE L.J. 753. A similar result is
reached if the issue is framed in terms of products liability. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v.
Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
56. See Lynn, supra note 5, at 704.
57. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B, Comment d at 1444 (1965), which
states: "As between the proved tortfeasor who has clearly caused harm and the entirely
innocent plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of the harm caused [by
other factors] should fall upon the former." Accord, Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251,257-59 (4th
Cir. 1975).
58. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
993 (1976) (burden of proving the plaintiff's non-reliance is on the defendant). But see Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973) (burden of reliance not rebuttable); ALI FED. SECURmES CODE § 1402(f)(2) at 90 (Mar.
1973 draft) (permitting reduction of the out-of-pocket damages to the extent that the defendant
proves that the violation did not cause the loss). See generally Comment, Measure of Damages
for Misrepresentation Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 135
(1977). But see Maxwell, supra note 47, at C-5.
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while preserving the meritorious private cause of action under the DTPA. In
this way the deterrent purpose of the Act would actually be enhanced.
Some support for the above causation analysis is found in Woods v.
Littleton, a recent Texas Supreme Court decision interpreting the DTPA.
In that case plaintiffs brought suit based on common law fraud and the
DTPA. The plaintiffs in Woods purchased a newly constructed house more
than a year before the effective date of the DTPA. According to the evi-
dence, the sewer system and septic tank in the new house did not work
properly from the day the house was purchased.' Several attempts were
made by the defendant to correct the problem, the last such attempt being
made in June or July of 1973. At some point after May 21, 1973, the effective
date of the DTPA, the defendants were found to have told the plaintiffs that
they had put the system in good working order. 6 In fact, the system was not
workable and the plaintiffs brought suit against the seller, alleging that the
refusal to complete the work was a deceptive act which caused a reduction
in the value of the home.
Relying upon two previous court of civil appeals cases,6 2 the Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that the date of the event which gives rise to the
cause of action rather than the date of the sale determines the applicability
of the Act, stating: "Although the sale which initiated the chain of events
which led to the act complained of accrued prior to the effective date of the
Act, that fact does not preclude recovery under the Consumer Protection
Act for a deceptive practice occurring after the effective date of the Act." 63
To reach that result, the court focused upon when the deceptive practice
occurred and whether it caused the alleged injury, and not upon whether the
deceptive act caused the initial sale of the house.' Having determined that
the deceptive act and not the sale caused the injury, the court concluded that
the damages would be computed from the time of the deceptive act and not
from the time of the sale. Thus, proof of the value of the house as represent-
ed at the time of the sale was irrelevant. 65 The plaintiff recovered damages
for mental anguish measured from the date of the deceptive act.66
If calculated from the date of the sale, however, both types of damages
would have been dramatically higher. Most of the reduction in the value of
the house probably occurred at the time of the sale or soon thereafter,
because the problems in the Woods' home were known soon after the time
of the sale. The construction company's failure to fix the problem would
probably have done little to decrease that value further, so the damage
resulting from the subsequent deceptive act, measured by the difference
59. 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
60. Id. at 664.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 665-66 (citing Town & Country Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Stiles, 543 S.W.2d 664
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ); Crawford Chevrolet, Inc. v. McLarty, 519 S.W.2d 656
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ)).
63. 554 S.W.2d at 665.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 672.
66. As a matter of law damages for mental anguish are not recoverable in an action for
common law fraud. Hudson & Hudson Realtors v. Savage, 545 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1977, no writ). Therefore, plaintiffs may not have lost that component of their
damages.
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between the value of the home as represented and its value as actually sold,
would of necessity have been quite low. Further, most of the mental anguish
suffered by the Woods probably occurred when the problem was discovered
and not when the construction company failed to correct the problem. Thus,
the Woods would have foregone substantial damages if they had maintained
their actions solely under the DTPA. 67
In certain circumstances, then, the plaintiff will have an incentive to plead
that the deceptive act occurred at the time of the sale, while the defendant
will attempt to characterize the deceptive act as having occurred at a later
date. Moreover, a plaintiff who finds that the statute of limitations bars his
action if the deceptive act occurred at sale will argue that the deceptive act
occurred at a later date.
In summary, in the face-to-face transaction when the consumer and seller
are on equal footing, the consumer should be required to prove actual
causation to maintain an action for damages. If the product is mass mar-
keted or if the product is highly complex, the consumer should have to
demonstrate at the least that his own intervening unreasonable behavior did
not cause the injury of which he complains. 68 Apart from these two situa-
tions, reliance or causation should be presumed particularly when the misre-
presentation is an omission; 69 nevertheless, that presumption should be
rebuttable, and the defendant should be given the opportunity to prove that
other factors were relied upon or caused the plaintiff's injury.
III. TREBLE DAMAGES
The element of causation distributes responsibility between the represent-
er and the consumer to determine the truth of the matter asserted in a
misrepresentation. Proving causation, with its shifting burdens of proof and
presumptions, is by far the most difficult aspect of the DTPA. Once the
injury is established and proven to have been caused by a material misrepre-
sentation, however, proven damages must be trebled. 70 The Texas Supreme
Court in Woods held that the monetary losses proven to have been suffered
by the plaintiff, must be trebled by the court;71 according to Woods, the trial
court has no discretion in the matter.
Section 17.50(b) of the DTPA provides that
[i]n a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may
obtain:
(1) three times the amount of actual damages ...
(2) an order enjoining such acts or failure to act;
67. But see note 66 supra.
68. Of course, a plaintiff may recover those additional losses suffered in attempting to
extricate himself from the result of a deceptive act. See Specter v. Mermelstein, 45 F.2d 474,
480-81 (2d Cir. 1973); Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Meadowlake
Foods, Inc. v. Estes, 148 Tex. 13, 219 S.W.2d 441 (1949); ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 215A,
Comment (4)(b) at 5 (Mar. 1973 draft); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548(a), Comment b
at 24 (1977).
69. Proving that one would have acted had the omitted information been available is a
speculative proposition at best. See Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Note,
The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584
(1975).
70. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
71. Id. at 669.
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(3) an order necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money
or property, real or personal, which may have been required in violation
of this subchapter; and
(4) any other relief which the court deems proper ....
In Woods the court reasoned that the position of the word "may," as
used in the introductory phrase of section 17.50(b), has as its subject, each
consumer. Therefore, the court continued, using "may" as a preface to the
four remedies gives the consumer discretion to choose among the four, but
does not give the trial court discretion to alter the kind of remedy provided.73
The court buttressed its decision with an analysis of the use of the term
"may" in other statutes and found that in at least one instance the word
"may" had been used in a similar fashion.74 Further support was dredged-up
from the Act's express general intent of aiding the small consumer in
recovering for consumer fraud .75 That consumers of any size and sophistica-
tion may bring suit for treble damages, against others who may not be as
sophisticated, was never mentioned. Indeed, in its original opinion the
supreme court quoted an exchange between two Texas senators relating to
the 1977 amendments to the DTPA to demonstrate that the legislature
understood that without the 1977 amendments providing for certain DTPA
defenses, treble damages would be mandatory. 76 In suggesting that an ex-
change between two senators in subcommittee some four years after the
passage of the initial Act gives some indication of what the legislature meant
when it passed the Act in 1973, the court departed from the Texas rule of
statutory construction which does not allow the court to use the reflections
of a subsequent legislature as evidence of a prior legislature's intent.
77
Even if the court reached the correct interpretation of the DTPA by
requiring that the trial court treble all damages which are proven, it is
conceivable that the interpretation so reached renders DTPA unconstitu-
tional in certain fact situations. Furthermore, it is probable that the court's
interpretation will reduce consumers' effective use of the recently revised
Texas class action procedure.
A. First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court recently ruled in Virginia State Board
72. DTPA § 17.50(b) (emphasis added).
73. 554 S.W.2d at 669.
74. Id. at 670. The court referred to a statute concerning new bonds for executors and
administrators, presently found at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 203 (Vernon 1956), discussed in
National Sur. Corp. v. Ladd, 131 Tex. 295, 115 S.W. 600 (1938).
75. 554 S.W.2d at 665. The court referred to DTPA § 17.44.
76. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 400, 407 (June 29, 1977). The following exchange was quoted by the
Texas Supreme Court:
'FARABEE: At the present time, the Texas Consumer Protection Act makes
no provision for alleviation of the rather harsh remedy of treble damages. Isn't
that correct?
'JONES OF HARRIS: That is correct, yes.
'FARABEE: And under your bill, there would be certain provision, set out in
Section 17.58 [sic] to give some alleviation of that remedy, for example, a bona
fide error, is that correct?
'JONES OF HARRIS: Would provide a defense against treble damages, yes.'
Id. This exchange was deleted from the opinion on rehearing.
77. Rowlan Oil Co. v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 162 Tex. 607, 263 S.W.2d 140 (1953);
Morris v. Calvert, 329 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc .78 that commercial
speech is entitled to first amendment protection. That ruling alters prior law
which characterized commercial speech as something less than protected
speech. 79 Narrowing its holding, however, the Court added that
"[U]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise has never been protected
for its own sake." ' Further, the Court stated:
[M]uch commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false,
but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State's
dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we
construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the
stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely. 8'
The Court suggests that commercial speech may be more closely re-
gulated by the Government than non-commercial speech to protect the free
exchange of commercial information. Closer inspection and enforcement of
the laws prohibiting false advertising is warranted because the profit motive
inherent in commercial speech makes that form of speech hardier than non-
commercial speech; in addition, the truth of commercial speech is more
easily discerned than political or social commentary.
8 2
By ruling that the DTPA requires the trial court to treble damages in all
cases, even in those situations in which the truth of the matters asserted may
not be easily discerned, the Texas Supreme Court may have transformed an
otherwise constitutional regulatory act into an unconstitutional one which
effectively prohibits commercial speech. Although the purpose of the act is
to deter misrepresentation in the market place, the Texas Supreme Court
interpretation of the DTPA goes far beyond that purpose; in certain cases, it
may deter the advertiser from rendering any opinion or any statement which
could be taken as an opinion about the effect or performance of a product.
For example, a consumer who for years purchases a drug from a pharmacist
and who later finds that the drug sold to him causes cancer might bring an
action against the pharmacist for the effects of the disease if the pharma-
cist's representations to the consumer did not include an analysis of the
possibility that the drug could cause cancer. Is the pharmacist's opinion, or
the opinion of anyone who produces a high technology product, more easily
proven true than social or political commentary? How can a merchant
disclose the potential difficulties in a new and untested product? Since many
product claims are based wholly upon untested opinion, the DTPA may
suppress commercial speech and may thereby violate the first amendment.8 3
Yet the Woods court, without even a hint of analysis, brushed aside the
first amendment argument, characterizing it as having "dubious merit."'
Surely, if the DTPA required actual damages to be multiplied by one hun-
78. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
79. See Valentine v. Crestenson, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81
F.T.C. 398, 417-73 (1972), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
80. 425 U.S. at 771.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 780-81 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 46 U.S.L.W. 2087 (U.S. Aug. 23, 1977); Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 472 (1971).
84. 554 S.W.2d at 671.
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dred, there would be a prohibitory effect on the advertiser's first amend-
ment rights. The vitality of commercial speech, the concept which under-
girds the Supreme Court's analysis in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, is
undercut if huge punitive damages are awarded without regard to the intent
and purpose of such speech. Moreover, when the character of a representa-
tion drifts into the expression of an opinion which is not readily subject to an
objective determination of truth or fancy, the DTPA does abridge the
merchant's freedom of speech.85 In such cases, the thrust of the DTPA
should be to emphasize that the results which are advertised are based upon
opinion or theory which is not yet provable.86 The purpose of the DTPA is to
increase correct market information; therefore, when it is impossible to
determine what is "correct information," the DTPA should encourage,
rather than suppress, debate and argument about a product's capabilities. If
interpreted otherwise, suppression of opinion not readily verifiable is an
unconstitutional application of the DTPA.
B. Bona Fide Error Defense
For transactions entered into after May 23, 1977, the constitutionality of
the DTPA is complicated by the 1977 amendment to the Act, which provides
for a "bona fide error defense." Adopted almost verbatim from the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Law,81 the crucial language of the defense reads:
In an action brought under section 17.50 of this subchapter actual
damages only and attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the amount
of work expended and court costs may be awarded where the defend-
ant:
(1) proves that the action complained of resulted from bona fide
error notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted
to avoid error.'
85. In Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2707, 53 L. Ed. 2d 810, 834 (1977) the Supreme
Court again reasoned that:
Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such
speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation
... . Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the scope of protec-
tion are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a prod-
uct or service that he provides, and presumably he can determine more readily
than others whether speech is truthful and protected.
86. See, e.g., FTC v. Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1970).
88. § 17.50(a) provides in full:
In an action brought under Section 17.50 of this subchapter, actual damages
only and attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the amount of work expended
and court costs may be awarded where the defendant:
(1) proves that the action complained of resulted from a bona fide error
notwithstanding the use of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid the error; or
(2) proves that he had no written notice of the consumer's complaint before
the suit was filed, or that within thirty (30) days after he was given written notice
he tendered to the consumer (a) the cash value of the consideration received
from the consumer, or the cash value of the benefit promised whichever is
greater, and (b) the expenses, including attorney's fees, if any, reasonably
incurred by the consumer in asserting his claim against the defendant; or
(3) In the case of a suit under 17.50(a)(2) the defendant proves that he was
not given reasonable opportunity to cure defect or malfunctions before the suit
was filed.
Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § I, at 600.
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Thus, the defendant who proves that he adopted all reasonable means
necessary to avoid a misrepresentation will be liable only for actual damages
and attorney's fees.
The Texas attorney general has argued forcefully that the bona fide error
defense would mitigate the harsh effects of treble damages.8 9 Yet the evolu-
tion of the defense in the Federal Truth-in-Lending context lends little
support to the attorney general's position.90 From its inception, the bona fide
error defense has been limited by the federal courts to clerical errors; it does
not extend to errors of law or judgment. 9' Thus, if the merchant creates a
false impression because of a typographical or printing error, he may raise a
bona fide error defense. If, however, the merchant misrepresents a prod-
uct's qualities or characteristics because he honestly believes that he should
omit certain matters from the advertisement, the merchant is liable.
Therefore, if Texas courts follow the federal courts' interpretation, they
will hold that the bona fide error defense does not insert a negligence
standard as a defense to a DTPA action. Substantive misrepresentations
would still be condemned without regard to fault or the intent of the mer-
chant; the Act would remain one which essentially imposes strict liability on
the person who makes a misrepresentation. If the federal interpretation is
followed, no appreciable change in the scope of the liability imposed by the
Act would be affected by the amendment, and the abridgement of a mer-
chant's first amendment speech rights would not be altered significantly by
the bona fide error defense. In the end the decision of the constitutionality
of the DTPA will rest upon an analysis of the degree to which the DTPA
prohibits the advertiser from expressing opinions which are not readily
ascertainable either as true or false.
C. Class Actions
The 1977 amendments dramatically alter the relief which may be granted
in class actions under the DTPA and may thereby have doomed the use of
the DTPA class action device in Texas. The pre-1977 DTPA contained a
class action procedure which allowed consumers who had been damaged in
an amount in excess of ten dollars to maintain an action for a class defined
and managed in all essential respects like federal rule 23. 92 Further, neither
the class nor the representative could recover more than actual damages, in
contrast to the individual plaintiff under the DTPA who could recover treble
damages. When it became evident that the Supreme Court of Texas would
89. "Even if plaintiff can show an implied warranty that has been breached, the [bona fide
error defense] bars him from recovering treble damages from the seller if the breach was
innocent and the seller has implemented reasonable procedures to avoid the breach." Second
Post Submission Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of the Attorney General at 10, Woods v.
Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977). This brief was written by Mr. Phil Maxwell. Yet, as
further "explained" by Mr. Maxwell in a speech in Dallas on Sept. 29, 1977, the Senate debate
on S.B. 664 makes it quite clear that the bona fide error defense is to he construed narrowly and
is to follow the interpretation of that same defense in the truth-in-lending context. Maxwell,
supra note 47, at C-16.
90. For an excellent summary of cases interpreting the bona fide error defense see Annot.,
27 A.L.R. Fed. 602 (1976).
91. Id.
92. Tex. Laws 1975, ch. 62, § 1, at 149; Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 143, § 1, at 327-30.
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adopt a class action procedure all but identical to federal rule 23, the
legislature repealed all sections of the DTPA which related to the class
action. 93 All DTPA class representatives are now free to seek treble damages
for themselves and for the class. Apart from the bona fide error exception, a
class can no longer recover solely for actual damages.
The potential liability and abuse of the class action device, particularly
when the misrepresentation is innocent, could be magnified in some cases
beyond the limits of fairness. The courts, when faced with a situation which
will allow windfall treble damages to an entire class while dealing a death
-blow to a company for an innocent misrepresentation, may find that the
class action device is not superior to other available means for "just and
efficient adjudication of the controversy" or that recovery in such circum-
stances violates the due process clause of the Constitution. Therefore, the
courts may refuse to certify the class. 94 Similar results reached by federal
courts in cases brought pursuant to rule 23 will probably provide guidance
and support to the Texas courts in such situations. 95 Mandatory treble
damages, coupled with the 1977 amendments, may have created a real
potential for abuse, and court reaction to that abuse may limit the consumer
class action.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some four years after its enactment, the DTPA remains an enigma within
the law. Although the Act has been used increasingly to recover for misre-
presentation in the marketplace, little light has been shed by reported deci-
sions on the concepts of materiality, reliance, and causation. Moreover, the
inconsistent interpretations given the Act by the attorney general and his
staff reflect a general confusion about the standards which should be applied
to determine whether a falsehood rises to the level of a deceptive act. The
new amendments to the Act which create strict liability for misrepresenta-
tions for services rendered to a business such as accounting, banking, and
insurance, coupled with court decisions requiring mandatory treble damages
for both the individual and class action, will engender a flood of litigation
giving rise to the need for sensitive analysis of the underlying purpose which
the DTPA was enacted to serve.
In view of the Act's increased potential for liability, the statutory de-
fenses and elements of the prima facie case will assume critical importance
as the primary battleground on which a case brought pursuant to the DTPA
will be won or lost. This Article has sought to review the development of the
Act, stressing the policy underlying consumer protection, and to identify
developments in securities law, products liability, and common law which
may provide instructive analysis. Particular attention has been given to the
93. See Tex. Laws 1977, ch. 216, § 4, at 605.
94. See Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. I1. 1972); Rattner v. Chemical
Bank, 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
95. To preserve the class action the representative consumer may agree to return two-
thirds of the treble damages to the defendant. Cf. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545,
548 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (class representative agrees to bring suit for actual damages rather than for
the statutory liquidated damages to avoid the due process considerations raised by the defend-
ant).
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Woods v. Littleton decision and its implications for the necessary elements
of a prima facie case, as well as to the availability of the class action
procedure. Finally, the constitutional implications of awarding treble dam-
ages are examined and the conclusion drawn that in some fact situations the
DTPA may pose substantial first amendment difficulties.
The DTPA remains a law of vast potential both for abuse and for
legitimately compensating the wronged consumer. It is a grand experiment
which requires a profound search for the purpose of the Act. Each element
of the prima facie case should be examined against the need to protect the
consumer rather than influenced by a misguided desire to purify the adver-
tiser's language at any expense to the merchant. Only by carefully balancing
the needs of the consumer with the burden imposed on the merchant in the
marketplace can the fairest and most lasting solution be reached.
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